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THE MINNESOTA MORTGAGE MORATORIUM
CASE
JOSEPH V.

HEEFFERNAN*

"There are thousands and thousands of contracts, whereof
equity forbids an exact literal performance.... Pass that government (the Constitution) and you will be bound hand and
foot."--Patrick Henry.
Thus Patrick Henry, foremost foe of adoption of the United
States Constitution, upon the "contract clause" (article 1, No.
10)1 in the great Constitutional debates in the Virginia convention of 1788 called to consider ratification of the "new government". On January 8th of this year the Supreme Court of the
United States struck out with cold courage to give its answer
to the charge of the orator of the Revolution. 2 Are we "bound
hand and foot"? Four of the Justices 3 believed that we are, for
our ultimate good. 4 The Court, speaking by Chief Justice
Hughes for the other five,5 held that we are not.6
*Of the Washington, Indiana, Bar.
1 "No state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of
contracts.... "
2 In the case of Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell et ux,
U. S. -, 54 S. Ct. 231 (Jan. 8, 1934).
3 Justices Sutherland, Butler, VanDeVanter, McReynolds.
4 54 S. Ct. 250: "....
. 'ultimately these debtor-relief-laws have always
proved to be injurious to the very class they were designed to relieve' . . .
5 Chief Justice Hughes, and Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and
Cardozo.
6 54 S. Ct. 231.
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The decision has become popularly known as the Minnesota
Mortgage Moratorium case. The action was instituted by Blaisdell and wife against the Home Building & Loan Association.
Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed by the state Supreme
Court, and the appeal is by the defendant. The validity of chapter 339 of the Laws of Minnesota of 1933, p. 514, approved April
18, 1933, is questioned, as being in contravention of the contract
clause (article 1, No. 10) and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution.
The preamble of the act recites the existing emergency, in
general, conditions known to all of us as a result of the depression, as applicable to mortgagors of real property. It then declares that during the continuance of the emergency foreclosure
of mortgages by advertisement is abrogated, and relief may be
had by foreclosure by action; that foreclosure sales may be postponed (part 1, No. 2), and periods of redemption may be extended, but in no event beyond May 1st, 1935 (part 1, No. 4,
No. 7). The act is to remain in effect "only during the continuance of the emergency and in no event beyond May 1, 1935".
No extension of the period of redemption and no postponement
of sale is to be allowed which would have the effect of extending
the period of redemption beyond that date (part 2, No. 8).
There is the usual separability clause (part 1, No. 9). Although there are still other provisions not mentioned, the court
specifically limits the decision in the present case to the validity
of part 1, No. 4.7 This section authorizes the district court to
extend the period of redemption from foreclosure sales "for such
additional times as the court may deem just and equitable" (but
not beyond May 1, 1935). The extension is to be made upon
application to the court, on notice, for an order determining
the reasonable value of the income of the property, or, if it has
no income, then the reasonable rental value of the property, and
directing the mortgagor to "pay all or a reasonable part of such
income or rental value, in or toward the payment of taxes, insurance, interest, mortgage or judgment indebtedness at such times
and in such manner" as shall be ordered by the court .... "Pro-

vided... that if such mortgagor.., shall default in the pay7 54 S. Ct. 232.
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ments, or any of them, in such order required ... his right to
possession shall cease and the party acquiring title to any such
real estate shall then be entitled to immediate possession of
said premises.... Provided, further, that prior to May 1, 1935,
no action shall be maintained... for a deficiency judgment until
the period of redemption as allowed by existing law or as extended under the provisions of this Act, has expired". Part 1,

No. 4.
Appellees invoked the provisions of this section, setting out
in their petition the execution of the mortgage, foreclosure, and
the sale to the mortgagee (appellant) for the full amount due,
$3,700.98. The time for redemption in the foreclosure suit
expired May 2nd, 1933. Upon the application of appellees, the
court extended this time to May 1st, 1935, subject to the condition that appellees pay to appellant $40 per month, to go to the
payment of taxes, insurance, interest, and mortgage indebtedness. The appeal is from this judgment.
IMPAIRMENT AND POLICE POWER
The writer hesitates to comment, except to commend the brilliance of the decision of the Chief Justice.. It marks him as a
student of the law who has thought deeply and courageously of
the problems of sociological jurisprudence; and as a Constitutional lawyer of remarkable prescience. As was John Marshall's
custom before him, he chose to write the opinion himself in a
case so important in its implications. The result is a review
of the development of Constitutional principles which displays
a thorough mastery of the precise points involved in the case
presented. His record of the majority view proceeds by close
but realistic progression to the conclusion that the statute is a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. It should be read
as a whole. Something of its force as a body of connected
thought is lost by the reproduction of excerpts.
Briefly stated the case seems to settle the following principles:
that the contract clause (article 1, No. 10) as interpreted by the
Supreme Court requires that the states shall not impair the
obligation of contracts, public or private: but "the prohibition
is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness
like a mathematical formula" ;8.. . "the reservation of essential
8 54 S. Ct. 236.
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attributes of sovereign power is . . . read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order . . .";9 i. e., a state may interfere
with contracts if it does so by a proper exercise of its police
power; the statute in question here is a proper exercise of the
police power of the state--"An emergency existed in Minnesota
which furnished a proper occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the state to protect the vital interests of the
community . . ."' 0-and for that reason the law is Constitutional.
This result is plainly evident in these especially significant
passages from the opinion of the Chief Justice:
"To ascertain the scope of the constitutional prohibition
(against impairment of the obligation of contracts) we examine the course of judicial decisions in its application. These
put it beyond question that the prohibition is not an absolute
one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula .... 11 Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by the measure of control which the state retains over remedial processes, but the state also continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. It does not
matter that legislation appropriate to that end 'has the result
of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect'. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 276, 53 S. Ct. 181, 189, 77 L.
Ed. 288. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order
to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. 1 2 ... The Legislature can
not 'bargain away the public health or the public morals',1 ...
The economic interests of the state may justify the exercise of
its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding
interference with contracts. 14 . . . With a growing recognition
of public needs and the relation of individual right to public
security, the court has sought to prevent the perversion of the
clause, through its use as an instrument to throttle the capacity
of the states to protect their fundamental interests.... The prin9 54 S. Ct. 239.
10 54 S. Ct. 242.

1154 S. Ct. 236.
12 54 S. Ct. 2S8.
'3

54 S. Ct. 239.

1454 S. Ct. 239.
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ciple of this development is, as we have seen, that the reservation of the reasonable exercise of the protective power of the
state is read into all contracts. 15 ... "
It may be conceded to the minority of the court that this was
not always the law. It would seem that the contract clause of
the United States Constitution is one phase of Constitutional
law which has shown unmistakable development from one stage
to another to its arrival in its present form as announced by the
Chief Justice. It may be of service to sound analysis to trace
some of the steps in this progression.
The contract clause (article 1, No. 10) was first invoked in
the Supreme Court as against state legislation in the case of
Fletcher v. Peck (1810), 6 Cranch 87. The litigation involved
the famous "Yazoo Land Fraud". In one of the greatest legislative swindles in history, the state of Georgia by special act
made grants of the state lands to certain corporations organized
to purchase them. These companies proceeded to sell off the
lands to other persons. Shortly after the time of the first grant,
a succeeding legislature passed an act purporting to repudiate
the former grant and resume the land. The Supreme Court held
that the first grant was a contract, and that the subsequent
legislation attempting to avoid the grant impaired the obligation
of that contract, and was, for that reason, unconstitutional.
The first instance of a private contract, i. e., one between one
individual and another, as opposed to a contract between the
state and an individual, to come before the Supreme Court for
consideration under this clause was that of Sturgis v. Crowninshield (1819), 4 Wheaton 192. This decision held that a state
bankruptcy law, in so far as applicable to a contract made before the enactment of the bankruptcy legislation, was unconstitutional as an impairment of the obligation of the contract. But
in his opinion Chief Justice Marshall saw fit to add what the
present Chief Justice refers to as "the seeds which the fathers
planted" :16 a statement that he was ready to imply as a condition to the contract clause that the state retained a power over
contracts already in force to legislate in the interests of humanity by abolishing imprisonment for debt.
"To punish honest insolvency by imprisonment for life, and
to make this a constitutional principle, would be an excess of
15 54 S. Ct. 242.
16 54 S. Ct. 242.
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inhumanity which will not readily be imputed to the illustrious
patriots who framed our constitution, nor to the people who
adopted it".'.

The case which has caused most confusion in the interpretation on the contract clause is Marshall's most celebrated onethe Dartmouth College case. 18 Dartmouth College had been incorporated by grant of royal charter in 1769. The charter fixed
the number, rights, and privileges of the trustees who were constituted the governing body of the school. By act of 1816 the
legislature of New Hampshire sought to vest authority in the
state for the appointment, by the governor, of a board of supervisors of the college and otherwise to take charge of the management of the school. Marshall's famous holding was that the
corporate charter of the college was a contract; and that the
legislation of 1816 purporting to alter it in the manner indicated was an impairment of the obligation of the contract, and
hence void.
The characteristically firm language of Chief Justice Marshall
in the opinion was interpreted to mean something not precisely
stated: that all corporations, including private business corporations, hold their charters immune from subsequent legislation
enacted as a proper exercise of the taxation power, 19 and the
police power of the state.2 0 It is this interpretation that is gen2
erally regarded as the doctrine of the Dartmouth College case. 1
The result was to give corporation a special advantage over individuals, whose private contracts among one another were never
held to be guaranteed such an immunity by the contract clause.
Three definite and progressive modifications of this doctrine
of the Dartmouth College case have appeared in the development
of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. The first was the
doctrine of strict construction of the charter against the grantee-corporation. This rule was announced by Chief Justice
Taney in the case of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge
(1837), 11 Peters 420, 9 L. Ed. 773. The effect of this doctrine
was to hold in each case that unless the corporate charter ex4 Wheaton 200.
18 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodard (1819), 4 Wheaton 518.
17

19Piqua Branch of State Bank of Ohio v. Knopp (1853), 16 Howard

369.
20

21

Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co. (1864), 1 Wallace 116.
Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall IV :278.
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pressly prohibits the exercise of the police power of the state
with respect to it, the state still has that power over it.
The second modification of the doctrine of the Dartmouth College case was accomplished by the widespread enactment of
general laws reserving to the legislature the right to alter or
repeal corporate charters. 22 The third development brings us to
the present doctrine of the Supreme Court as re-asserted in the
case under review: that a charter is a contract, but that its grant
is impliedly subject to the reserved right of the state to exercise
its power of eminent domain 23 and its police power 24 , 25 over the
terms of the contract. The principle involved in this latter development was first announced in the Supreme Court by Justice
Miller in 1869, in a dissenting opinion. 26 It became the doctrine
of the court, so far as the exercise of the police power over contracts is concerned, in the year 1879.27 Hence it would seem
that the decision of the case under review announced no radically new principle, the journalistic comment to the contrary
notwithstanding.
But a further distinction is to be observed. Both the Dartmouth College case (which caused the confusion) and the cases
which announced the modifications of the doctrine of that case
were instances in which public contracts were involved, i. e.,
contracts between the state and a private individual or individuals. The case under review is not an example of a public contract, but a private contract between private persons entirely.
In spite of the fact that the doctrine of the Dartmouth College
case was for a time interpreted by the Supreme Court to protect
public contracts from any interference with them by the police
power of the state, no case in the Supreme Court has ever held
22 Ibid., IV:278. Also, Covington v. Kentucky (1899), 173 U. S. 231.
It is of interest to note that Indiana never passed such a statute.
23 West River Bridge v. Dix, 6 Howard 507, 12 L. Ed. 535. Long Island

Water Company v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685, 17 S. Ct. 718, 41 L. Ed. 1165.
24

By dictum in Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts (1878), 97 U. S. 25,

32, 33, 24 L. Ed. 989.

By squarely so holding in Stone v. Miss. (1879), 101

U. S. 814, 819, 25 L. Ed. 1079.

Also in Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent

City Co. (1883), 111 U. S. 746, 750, 4 S. Ct. 652, 28 L. Ed. 585; Ill. Central
R. R. Co. v. Illinois (1892), 146 U. S. 387, 13 S. Ct. 110; Texas & N. 0.

R. R. Co. v. Miller (1911), 221 U. S. 408, 414, 31 S. Ct. 534, 55 L. Ed. 789.
25 Except as to rates of public callings, 13 Va. L. R. 158.
26 In Washington University v. Roush, 8 Wall. 438, 443, 444.
a taxation case, but it is submitted the principle is the same.
27

Stone v. Mississippi, supra.

This is
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that private contracts carried the same immunity. Manigault
v. Springs (1905), 199 U. S. 473, 26 S. Ct. 127, 50 L. Ed. 274,
squarely held that such contracts are subject to that limitation,
and other cases since have reiterated the principle, Mr. Justice
Holmes, with his characteristic felicity of expression, stated
the result of these cases involving private contracts:
"One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, can not remove them from the power of the state by
making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it
the infirmity of the subject matter".2 8
The reason for the rule developed by these cases finds one of
its best expressions in the first decision which made it the principle of the Supreme Court.29 Speaking through Chief Justice
Waite the court said:
"All agree that the legislature can not bargain away the police
power of a state.., the power of governing is a trust committed
by the people to the government, no part of which can be
granted away. The people, in their sovereign capacity, have
established their agencies for the preservation of the public
health and the public morals, and the protection of public and
private rights. These several agencies can govern according to
their general authority, while in power; but they can not give
away nor sell the discretion of those that are to come after them,
in respect to matters, the government of which, from the very
nature of things, must vary with varying circumstances."
These decisions 0 of the Supreme Court clearly marked the
path as a guide for the opinion of the Justices in the case under
review. The principle had already been settled that the state
had the right to deal with the terms of the contract after the
fact provided it did so as a proper exercise of its police power,
i. e., that there was present some social interest which justified
this particular legislation. This brings us to that part of the
opinion of the Chief Justice most often quoted:
28 Hudson County Water Company v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 357, 28 S. Ct.
529, 531, 52 L. Ed. 828, 14 Ann. Cas. 560.
29 Stone v. Mississippi, supra, note 27.
8o See note 24, supra.
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"Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not
increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions
imposed upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution
was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of
power to the federal government and its limitations of the power
of the States were determined in the light of emergency, and
they are not altered by emergency. . . While emergency does
not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the
exercise of power. . ... 31
To the minority these words are simply incomprehensible.
Of them Justice Sutherland says:
"I can only interpret what is said on that subject as meaning
that, while an emergency does not diminish a restriction upon
power, it furnishes an occasion for diminishing it; and this, as
it seems to me, is merely to say the same thing by the
use of another set of words, with the effect of affirming that
32
which has just been denied".
And to Edward S. Corwin, author of an article upon the case
under review, 33 in which some otherwise good points are made,
the words of the Chief Justice as set out just above are also
regarded as a contradiction. But to this writer his statement
would seem but a dramatic way of saying that: it is not the
emergency which calls into existence the police power of the
state ("While emergency does not create power") ; that power
is already present, but in abeyance until an appropriate factual
situation calls for and justifies its use; the existence of the emergency may furnish the appropriate factual situation which justifies a proper exercise of the police power of the state ("emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.").
Or in other words, a social interest may be present in an emergency which would not be present in normal times. Such social
interest present only during the emergency would furnish justification for the exercise of the police power during the emergency.
S 54 S. Ct. 235.
32 54 S. Ct. 252.
33 "Moratorium Over

Minnesota," 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 315.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

. . . the reservation of the reasonable exercise of the protective power of the state is read into all contracts". 34 At this
time this principle of our constitutional jurisprudence is too
deeply imbedded to be denied. .The minority do not attempt to
do so. They concede:
"It is quite true also that 'the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts'; and that
the Legislature can not 'bargain away the public health or the
public morals' .35

Justice Sutherland, writing for the minority, then contends that
this principle is inapplicable to the statute under review. If the
writer properly understands the Justice's view it is that whenever the police power has been invoked against contracts in the
class of cases given, 36 it has totally destroyed the contract, rendered performance of each and every term of the contract unlawful. "The contract is frustrated-it disappears in virtue
of an implied condition to that effect read into the contract itself".3 7 (Citing an English case). But in the case under review
he argues the statute "does not have the effect of, frustrating
the contract by rendering its performance unlawful", but merely
postpones the time of performance.3 8 On that ground he believes it is to be distinguished from the rule established by the
39
cases cited.
It would seem to the writer that this is an attempt to demonstrate that the legislature may not use its police power to strike
down-"frustrate"-a single provision of a contract where the
social interest requires interference with that one provisions
only, while conceding that the state has the power to invalidate
-"frustrate"-the whole contract. An assertion that the ax of
the state police power is powerful enough to fell tle whole tree,
but not strong enough to prune a limb.
34 54 S. Ct. 242.

35 54 S. Ct. 253.

36 See note 24, supra. Curiously enough, however, upon the discussion
of this point the minority do not cite these cases given in note 24, although
they are the leading ones, but cite three English cases. Marshall v. Glanville (1917), 2 K. B. 87, 91; In re. Shipton, Anderson & Co. Ltd. v. AngloMexican Petroleum Products Co., Ltd. (1916), 2 A. C. 397.

37 54 S.Ct. 254.
38 54 S. Ct. 254.
39

See note 24, supra.
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IS THE STATUTE A FAIR ONE?

It is worthwhile to repeat that the residuum of protective
power which the state has over contracts among its citizens does
not justify any and every interference with the obligation of the
contract. The legislation must be reasonable in tenor, and called
into existence by the presence of a social interest which justifies
its being.40 In the case under review the existence of the emergency recited in the preamble of the act furnished the social
interest for the enactment of the measure. This the minority
does not deny, but proceeds upon the theory that no emergency,
no matter how great, justifies interference with the obligation
41
of contracts, in the manner here attempted, at least.

Nevertheless the task remained for the Chief Justice to demonstrate that the section of the statute under review (Part 1,
No. 4)42 was a "reasonable exercise of the protective power of
the state". After reviewing briefly the emergency conditions, he
states that the relief afforded to the mortgagor under the statute
"could be granted only upon reasonable conditions". 43 Such,
conditions he finds fulfilled. 44 During the extended period of
redemption the integrity of the mortgage indebtedness is not
impaired; interest continues to run; the sale is not invalidated.
While the mortgagor may retain possession during the extended
period, he must pay for that privilege the rental value of the
property as judicially ascertained. Thus the mortgagee is not
without compensation during the time that possession is withheld from him. That the Chief Justice is a believer in the logic
of realities is then demonstrated by his disposition to take judicial notice that mortgagees are predominately corporations, such
as insurance companies, banks, and investment and mortgage
companies. 45 As such their concern is for a fair return upon
their investment; not possession of the mortgaged real estate.
The statute was designed to provide for this object, during the
continuance of the existing emergency.
In contesting the fairness of the statute, the minority is upon
safer ground. Some ghost-dancing can always be done upon
the meaning of the word "fair". Justice Sutherland is con40 54 S. Ct. 242.

41
42
43
44

54
54
54
54
4 54

S.
S.
S.
S.
S.

Ct.
Ct.
Ct.
Ct.
Ct.

250.
232.
242.
242, 243.
243.
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vinced that the State of Minnesota has not kept faith with the
mortgagee. He takes up one by one the record of the former
cases of legislative interposition on behalf of the mortgagor.
Bronson v. Kinzie (1843), 1 How. 311, 11 L. Ed. 143, which held
invalid a statute extending the period of redemption for twelve
months after the sale, and another preventing a sale unless a bid
of two-thirds of the appraised value of the property should be
made. Gantly's Lessee v. Ewing (1845), 3 How. 707, 11 L. Ed.
794, held unconstitutional as applied to a pre-existing mortgage,
an act of the Indiana legislature which provided that no real
property should be sold on execution for less than half its appraised value. Howard v. Bugbee (1860), 24 How. 461, 16 L.
Ed. 753, declared invalid a statute which authorized a redemption of mortgaged property within two years after the sale.
Barnitz v. Beverly (1896), 163 U. S.118, 16 S. Ct. 1042, 41 L.
Ed. 93, struck down a statute which extended the period of redemption for a period of eighteen months, during which time
the mortgagor was to remain in possession and receive the rents
and profits, except as necessary for repairs.
These cases were not ignored by the Chief Justice. Of them
he says:

"None of these cases . . .is directly applicable to the

question now before us in view of the conditions with which
the Minnesota statute seeks to safeguard the interests of the
mortgagee-purchaser during the extended period". 46

Surpris-

ingly enough the minority concede that there is some "substantial difference" between the statute under review and those
stricken down in the cases just above cited by them, in these
words:
"The only substantial difference between those cases and the
present one is that there the extension of the period of redemption and postponement of the creditor's ownership is accompanied by the condition that the rental value of the property shall,
in the meantime, be paid". 4 T
Justice Sutherland then contends that "A conclusion that payment of the rental value during the two-year period of postponement is even the approximate equivalent of immediate ownership and possession is purely gratuitous". 48 He points out
46 54

S. Ct. 238.

47 54

S. Ct. 255.

4854

S. Ct. 255.
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that full ownership in the mortgagee, as originally contracted
for, might prove very necessary to him; that "the financial
needs of appellant may become so pressing as to render it urgently necessary that the property shall be sold for whatever
it may bring". 49 The writer believes that the minority have a
point here; not a point of sufficient importance in the probable
course of events to outweigh the larger social considerations
which justify the interposition of the police power in this case;
but nevertheless a point of some weight. If a mortgagee were
so placed as urgently to need whatever cash he could get, the
writer submits the minority is correct in asserting that actual
ownership is a condition of realization of that end. It would
be virtually impossible to negotiate a sheriff's certificate of sale,
subject to two years of possession in a man with a grievance,
to any purchaser except at a ruinous discount. The Indiana
foreclosure statute of 193150 has recognized this principle, by
postponing the sheriff's sale until the end of the year of redemption, thus enabling the purchaser to receive his deed at once,
and thereby encouraging competitive bidding at the sale.
The Chief Justice expressly limited the decision to consideration of one section of the act (Part 1, No. 4).51 The order of
the district court under this section seems as fair as possible
to the mortgagee. The statute represents a high tide in judicial
discretion, so enthusiastically championed by Dean Roscoe
Pound 52 and Jerome Frank.5 3 It allows the district court to fix
the payment of rental value during the extended period of redemption "at such times" as shall be ordered by the court.54
The statute could be circumvented by an order that the rental
value for the two year interim period be paid in a lump sum
at the end of the extended time. Part 1, No. 2, abrogates foreclosure by advertisement, and requires that the proceeding be
by action. In suits already commenced as a condition of this
relief the mortgagor must pay the costs incurred in the advertisement proceeding. But "not including attorney's fees".5 5
The legislature likes to show its teeth to the lawyers. Part 1,
49

54 S. Ct. 256.

50 Acts of 1931, p. 257.

51 54 S. Ct. 232.
52 "The Decadence of Equity" (1905), 5 Col. L. R. 20.
53 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind. Part 2, Ch. 1.
Part 1, No. 4.
55 Part 1, No. 2.

54

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

No. 3, authorizes the court to order a resale of the property
"if it appears ... that the sale price is unreasonably and unfairly
inadequate". The court could order a resale in any case where
the bid by the mortgagee made possible a deficiency judgment.
It is not contended that the district court judges will push these
possibilities to their extreme. To do so would seem an abuse
of judicial discretion. But the possibilities are there.
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF SUCH LEGISLATION
Both the majority 56 and the minority 57 take the position that
the court is not concerned with the wisdom of such legislation.
Its only problem is the constitutionality of the statute. This,
of course, is correct. Yet in view of the magnitude of interests
involved the subject should be worthy of some discussion here.
The ordinary estimate is that there are twenty billion dollars
of real estate mortgages outstanding in the United States, held
principally by savings banks, insurance companies, building and
loan associations, and land banks. Each person interested in
these companies, as investor, bondholder, or policy-holder is, or
should be, vitally concerned with this type of legislation.
From the historical standpoint, there would seem to be no
doubt that one of the prime considerations which prompted men
of standing in the community to favor the adoption of an entirely new plan of government to supplant the Articles of Confederation was the desire on their part to secure the strong arm
of a central power as a guaranty of the stability of contracts,
and thereby to restore confidence in commercial intercourse. 58
"Finance, commerce, and business assembled the historic Philadelphia Convention; although it must be said that statesmanship
guided its turbulent councils". 5 9 The evil of interference by the
states with the obligation of contracts under the Articles of
Confederation had become so great as to paralyze trade, destroy
all confidence between man and man, and reduce the flow of
credit far below the normal needs of the community. 60 To remedy this condition, "Finance, commerce, and business" inserted
56 54 S. Ct. 243.
57 54 S. Ct. 256.
58 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheaton 213, 354, 455, 6 L. Ed. 606.
59 Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 1:310.
60 Ogden v. Saunders, supra, note 58.
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the contract clause (article 1, No. 10) in the United States Constitution.61
Many considerations for and against such legislation would
seem to lie on the surface. In the words of one newspaper comment: "The decision is hailed by farmers and their political
friends as a great victory when as a matter of fact it will eventually be a costly decision to the class moratoriums are supposed
to benefit". 62 The thought behind this observation is of course
that the creditor will be frightened by the possibility of such
legislation, and credit streams will dry up, causing a horribly
frozen real estate market. It would seem incontrovertible that
the sale price of any property is determined to a considerable
extent by its availability as collateral or security. If it has no
collateral or security value, it becomes a prime example of a
frozen asset. The result in the real estate field is the depreciation of the capital value of all holdings. On the other hand the
proponents of this type of legislation regard the paramount
necessity of arresting the inexorable march of deflation as worth
the risk of future credit impairment. To them each dispossession
by process of foreclosure is a social scar deserving of greater
attention than the forecast of a credit drought in another decade.
Suggestions that the debtor's troubles are due to prodigal borrowing 63 make them see red.
In the opinion of the writer the requirement that the rental
value of the property be paid to the mortgagee during the extended period of redemption amply safeguards his interest, and
for that reason the statute is a fair exercise of the police power
of the state. However, the writer is considerably puzzled to
01 It is true that the clause was inserted hurriedly, at the last minute,

and almost without discussion. "The framers of the instrument apparently
had in mind, however, the danger of the violation of contracts through
depreciated paper money rather than the invalidation of agreements by

direct action of the State Legislatures .... Madison best stated the reason
for the adoption of the contract clause: 'A violations (sic) of Contracts
had become familiar in the form of depreciated paper made a legal tender,
of property substituted for money, of Instalment laws, and of the occlusions

of the Courts of Justice; although evident that all such interferences affected the rights of other states, relatively Creditor, as well as Citizens
Creditors within the State.' (ib., 548.) Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth explained briefly that the clause "was thought necessary as a secur-

ity to commerce."

(Letter to the Governor of Connecticut, Sept. 26, 1787,

ib., 100.) Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, Vol. III, p. 557, note 3.
62 Helena, Montana, "Independent": The Literary Digest 117:5.
63 In the minority opinion, 54 S.Ct. 252.
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know how such a statute can be of material benefit to any
worthwhile number of debtors. It is his belief that had the
mortgagor paid a sum equal to the rental value of the property
to the mortgagee all along there would have been no foreclosure;
that not one mortgagee in a hundred would refuse to carry the
debt, even though in technical default, if such payments were
made. Hence it would seem that those persons who seek mortgage moratoria are not the ones who are paying the rental value
of the property to the mortgagee, but they who are not making
any such return. This class will not be satisfied with legislation
of the type sustained by the Supreme Court. They will want
terms more favorable to themselves, and necessarily less favorable to the mortgagee. The agitation for a different law must
then continue. If this is the meaning of the passage from Justice Sutherland's opinion most widely quoted:
"He simply closes his eyes to the necessary implications of the
decision who fails to see in it the potentiality of future gradual
but ever advancing encroachments upon the sanctity of private
64
and public contracts",
there would seem to be merit in it as an indictment of the wisdom of this type of legislation. Faced with the constant danger
of interference with his contract in a manner which may prove
unreasonable, the investor may become discouraged with the
outlook for mortgage loans, and turn to other fields for capital
placement, with the consequent freezing of the real estate market in the manner already indicated. Insurance companies and
savings banks are in a position to begin such a policy of "switching" their investments at any time.65
To the writer there would seem to be no cause for alarm in
the camp of the mortgagee in the result of the case under review.
For the last half century it has been the doctrine of the Supreme
Court that the state retains a power over the contracts of its
citizens, as the cases already reviewed have shown. But the
64 54

S. Ct. 244.

65 To which the answer might be made: is there any field to which they
can switch and escape the long arm of the police power reaching out to
protect "the vital interests of its people"? Long regarded as the prime
investment for safety, United States government bonds payable "in United
States gold coin of the present standard of weight, measure and fineness"
have been made payable in dollars by recent legislation after the fact."
Mason's U. S. Code, Title 31, No. 430-4.
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limits of that power as applicable to the mortgage contract were
but obscurely defined. The present decision adds much in reassuring us that the last word in these matters is not the word
of the demagogue, nor the political word, but that in each instance there will be a judicial examination of the competing
claims of the contract to precise enforcement and the economic
interests of society as a whole in interfering with the provisions
of the agreement upon terms fair to both contracting parties.
The holding of the court is authority for the point that the
mortgagee must be treated fairly at the hands of the state. No
citizens in a complicated social order can ask more.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE

It would seem that the case has a greater significance as a
guide to the probable action of the court upon other great constitutional problems likely to come before it as the outgrowth of
"new deal" legislation, than for its bearing upon mortgage
moratoria. The opinions of majority and minority seem evidence of the outlook of each member of the court upon the relative importance of individual rights as against the interests of
the social group. These distinct viewpoints seem to correspond
with two of the periods of Anglo-American legal history as defined by Dean Roscoe Pound and expounded by Prof. Hugh E.
Willis. 66 These are the "Period of Maturity", and the "Period
of Socialization". The end of the law in the period of maturity
67
was "the protection of property and freedom of contract".
This period began about 1793. For the minority in the case
under review it has never ended. Dean Pound states that the
end of the law in the period of socialization is: "The satisfaction of as many de facto human interests as possible in so far
as they involve a social advantage". For the majority this is
the present period of the history of American jurisprudence.
For the minority it has not yet begun.
It is true that Justice Sutherland does not deny that legislation in the larger social interest has been sustained although
the rights and liberties of the individual were thereby interfered
with. 68 But he would seem to have little sympathy with that
66 Willis, "Introduction to Anglo-American Law," p. 64.
67 Ibid., p. 119.

68 It is quite true that the Legislature can not "bargain away the
public health or the public morals". 54 S. Ct. 253.
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trend whenever it adversely affects contractual rights. He
quotes with approval the following: "Policy and humanity are
dangerous guides in the discussion of a legal proposition". 69
His approach to the case under review is ample evidence that to
him the preservation from encroachment by the state of the
rights of the individual, his freedom of contract, and the sacroscant character of his engagements should be the prime concern
of judicial safeguards. This was precisely the object of the law
in the period of maturity: the protection of the contract as
property. It is the typical laissez-faire attitude-a doctrine
which naively assumes that each man, trusted to his own resources, will care for himself. The gratuitous assumption of
this theory is that each man knows his own interest and can
pursue it. Time has discredited that premise. And yet four
members of the court decline to acknowledge that the period of
socialization of the law is not merely a wilful iconoclasm, but
the liquidation of an older order of human relations.
In abrupt contrast to this view stands one of the most remarkable judicial declarations of the object of the law made in this
generation. The words of the Chief Justice deserve to be set
out at length:
"It is manifest from this review of our decisions that there
has been a growing apprehension of public needs and of the
necessity of finding ground for a rational compromise between
individual rights and public welfare. The settlement and consequent contraction of the public domain, the pressure of a constantly increasing density of population, the interrelation of the
activities of our people and the complexity of our economic interests, have inevitably led to an increased use of the organization of society in order to protect the very bases of individual
opportunity. Where, in earlier days, it was thought that only
the concerns of individuals or of classes were involved, and that
those of the state itself were touched only remotely, it has later
been found that the fundamental interests of the state are directly affected; and that the question is no longer merely that
of one party to a contract as against another, but of the use of
reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon
7
which the good of all depends". O
69 54 S. Ct. 252, from Edwards v. Kearzey (1877), 96 U. S. 595, 604, 24

L. Ed. 793.
70 54 S. Ct. 241.
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He proceeds immediately to the application of these principles
to the constitutional question before the court:
"It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the
Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must mean to
the vision of our time.... It was to guard against such a narrow
conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable
warning: 'We must never forget, that it is a constitution we
are expounding' (McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, 407,
4 L. Ed. 579); 'a constitution intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs'. Id., page 415 of 4 Wheaton.".71
From these general statements considerable help is given in
forecasting the decision of the court upon such questions as may
be presented to it under the "gold clause" legislation, and the
regulations requiring all gold to be surrendered to the fecteral
government. If the minority can be counted to agree with
every statement made by Justice Sutherland, then four votes
would seem to be "in the bag" to strike down any act of Congress which would attempt to make obligations payable in gold
coin dischargeable by tender of something else. For he says:
"Certainly, if A should contract with B to deliver a specified
quantity of wheat on or before a given date, legislation, however
it might purport to act upon the remedy, which had the effect
of permitting the contract to be discharged by the delivery of
corn of equal value, would subvert the constitutional restriction.".72
Substitute "gold" for "wheat" and "dollars" for "corn" and you
have it. Of course the contract clause (article 1, No. 10) does
not forbid action by congress. But the due process clause of the
Fifth amendment to the United States Constitution has been
interpreted to protect contracts from action by Congress just as
the contract clause protects them from action by the states. The
property; to impair
theory of the holding is that contracts are
73
their validity is not due process of law.
71 54 S. Ct. 242.
72 54
73

S. Ct. 256.

The Sinking Fund cases, 99 U. S. 700.
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But on the other hand a prediction of what the court may do
in these cases yet to come before it would seem to be justified
by the attitude of the majority in the decision under review expressed in their profound appreciation of the vast ebb and flow
of forces which sway and condition human destinies. There
would appear to be no distinction in principle between this case
and those. The thorough understanding of the aims and trend
of sociological jurisprudence which furnished the solution to the
decision in this case would seem to be applicable there as well.

